February 2024 Vidcast // HPE acquires Juniper Network
A $14 billion deal that paves the way for the AI networking battle with Cisco.
An audacious $14 billion gamble to steal the crown of networking leader from Cisco. It’s a battle of the networking titans, with HPE pitted against Cisco to dominate the AI networking era.
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Hello and welcome to this Vidcast, which is devoted
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to the acquisition of Juniper Networks
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by Hewlett Packard Enterprise by HPE.
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First, let's start with a little bit
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of historical background.
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Once upon a time in the seventies in Palo Alto,
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there is a creation of the Palo Alto Research Center,
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but it comes from a little bit earlier, a a few years
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before a person invented a technology thanks
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to which you can replace a classical photo copier by
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dry writing.
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The patent is offered to Kodak, to Eastman Kodak,
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and to IBM.
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They're going to refuse following the very well known
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principle of not invented here.
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I did not invent, so it's not good.
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The company whose name is Helo Corporation based in
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Rochester, New York Bay, is always the same town as Eastman.
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Kodak is going to buy the patent.
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The CEO is going to bet the future
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of the company on the patent,
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and it's going to become Xerox.
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It comes from ancient Greek.
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Zero graph means dry writing, something like that.
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The company is going to experience a monopolistic situation
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during a few years and it's going to make a lot of money.
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But the problem is one day the patent will expire.
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And what about next?
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Next, you will have to offer new innovative product to
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customers, and this is why the Palo Alto Research Center is
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created by Xerox.
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In order to develop innovations, there will be up
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to 5,000 researchers in a kind
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of freedom in this very well-known
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institution at that time.
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Xerox is generating a 60% gross margin,
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which is absolutely huge, a very significant part of that.
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It's going to be invested in research
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and development, Palo Alto Research Center.
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Now, they are going to develop plenty of technologies,
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for example, local Hart Networks, ethernet
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and so on, so forth, and they're going
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to develop the laser printers, which are going to more
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or less replace the photocopiers in their top line,
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inner the revenues of Xerox.
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So there will be plenty of innovations coming from the park,
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but Fortune Magazine published an article in the eighties
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who started, was a lab that ran away from Xerox.
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Xerox was Helo Corporation based in Rochester, New York.
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They're going to move the head office from Rochester
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to Stanford, Connecticut,
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but from east coast to east coast,
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Palo Alto is in California.
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It's a west coast, and there is a very important cultural
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misunderstanding between the east coast and the west coast.
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The communication between r and d
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and marketing is going to be a disaster
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for the marketing experts.
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All these innovations are kind of gimmicks,
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including the very famous mouse which was
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created in the park.
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When the marketing experts saw the mouse,
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it says there is absolutely no future.
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The arrow keys in the computer, it's much better Now
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as a consequence of the relationship between Xerox
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and Apple, Steve Jobs is allowed to do a kind
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of shopping in the park and is going to buy
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and integrate the mouse
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with a wig graphical interface, et cetera, et cetera.
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So these innovations created by Xerox are going
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to be developed in the product sold by Apple.
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These innovations are going to get out
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of the research center,
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but the researchers themselves are going
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to be quite frustrated by the process.
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They're going to go out
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and they are going to create their own startups
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among the researchers who left the park
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to create their own companies.
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As an Indian person whose name is Pip Sindu,
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he's a very well known scientist, very experienced one.
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He spent 11 years in the park
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and he's an expert in telecommunications equipment.
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In 1996, he leaves Park
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to create a company whose name is Juniper Networks.
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Now he's a great scientist, but technology is not enough.
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You need a manager and Crosspoint Venture Partners.
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He's going to hire Scott Green, who is going
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to be the CEO from 1996 to 2008.
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Then it will step back as a CEO,
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but remain chairman of the board.
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The person who really contributed
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to the fantastic development
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of gene repair networks in the early years is Scott Cranes.
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Now we are in the nineties, second half of the nineties,
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and these are the golden years
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for the telecommunication equipment industry.
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A very well-known Canadian company, Northern Telecom,
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Nortel Networks, whose end is going to be
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absolutely terrible is selling telecom equipment to 90%
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of the Fortune 500 companies loosened.
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The telecom equipment activity within at
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and t is going to be spun off in 1996
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to start its life by itself.
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ENT will merge with Alcatel in 2006
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and Alcatel ENT is going to be acquired by Nokia in 2016.
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Nokia is so well known for the very famous
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terminal right in the mobile business.
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Ericsson is also a very big player.
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They are going to invent the Bluetooth technology,
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but in this industry, the number one is definitely Cisco.
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In March, 2000, Cisco is going to be the largest
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worldwide capitalization of stock market
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during three months,
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and the value of the company at that time is $500 billion,
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which is absolutely outstanding.
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20 something years ago.
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The second half of the nineties is the explosion
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of telecommunication equipment,
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but it is a creation of the internet bubble.
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So-called Internet bubble.
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If you look back in 95,
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the NASDAQ is about 600, 700.
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It's going to go up to 4,500
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and more in March, 2000,
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and then it's going to dramatically go down.
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The Nasdaq is going to lose two thirds of its value back
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to 1,500.
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Today, NASDAQ is not back to 4,000 and something.
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Today NASDAQ is 16,000.
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So the tech business is doing quite well.
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What about the business of Juniper Networks?
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Juniper is a Cisco killer.
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They are plenty of competitors
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and they all are supposed to be challenges of Cisco,
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the number one, and there's a technological advantage
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for Juniper because the software is embedded
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in the hardware, which is not the case of Cisco.
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If you want to buy the equipment at Cisco, the router,
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you have to buy the hardware
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and you have to integrate the software.
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It's already done by Juniper.
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This is a technological advantage,
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but Cisco has a much broader product range to offer
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to the customers, which is a business advantage,
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an outstanding business advantage.
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So on the one side,
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you have outstanding scientific performance for Juniper
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and very big business offer for Cisco.
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What's going to be absolutely outstanding in the development
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of Juniper is revenues.
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The company is created in 19 96, 8 years later in 2004,
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the company's generating 4 billion euros
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of turnover starting from scratch.
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Eight years before, just to give you an idea,
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apple took 11 euros to move from zero
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to $4 billion of revenues.
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It gives you an idea about the quality
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of the business development.
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Now in terms of market share, for the core routers,
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the business in which Cisco is a leader in 2001,
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the market share of Juniper is 37%.
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So it's very successful scientific
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performance, business performance.
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Now what about stock market performance?
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The company is listed in 1999.
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Exactly when the NASDAQ is skyrocketing, the stock price
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is showing plus 191%
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the first day of listing.
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You remember in another vidcast I explained
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what happened to Snowflake.
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As far as Snowflake was concerned,
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the stock price was multiplied by two.
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The first day of listing here,
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it's almost multiplied by three.
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During the first year of quotation, the stock price is going
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to be multiplied by five,
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but it is a consequence of the creation
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of this internet bubble.
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Now, quite quickly, the company is reaching a revenue
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of 4 billion, and that is going to stabilize
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in 2017 when Nokia is potentially interested
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in buying Juniper networks for $16 billion.
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The revenues generated by the company
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are only 4.9 billion.
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You remember it was 4 billion in 2004,
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and both Nokia
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and Juniper are looking for clients, for new clients,
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for gross revenues.
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When Juniper is listed,
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the market capitalization is $1.7 billion
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and the stock price is $34 per share.
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Now the nominal is going to be divided by six,
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and today the stock market, the market capitalization
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of the company is 11.8, almost $12 billion.
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And the stock price recently
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because of the acquisition, moved from 30 to 37.
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So it looks like the same stock price,
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but the nominal has been divided by six.
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This is why the value has been multiplied by six.
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Now, there is a very interesting multiple,
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which gives you an idea about the profitability,
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the performance of the company,
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but also the prospects for growth.
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Multiple is enterprise value divided by a bid,
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and it is 16, which demonstrate that the market sees
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some in potential improvement in the situation of Juniper.
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It's quite interesting to confront the evolution
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of Juniper the last five years
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and the evolution of the Nasdaq.
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Very simply, as far as the NASDAQ is concerned, multiplied
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by two, of course there were some fluctuations.
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It went up dramatically. It went down.
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It's up again from five years ago to today, plus 200%.
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As far as Juniper is concerned,
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it's plus 27 up to the murmur.
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The HPE is making an offer and today it's plus 60%,
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but as a consequence of the offer,
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but standing alone, uh, the last five years,
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it shows a return of plus 27% for the shareholders.
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A few weeks ago, the 10th of January, 2024,
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HPE Hewlett Packet Enterprise announces that it's going
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to buy Juniper Networks for an enterprise value of
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$14 billion.
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HP is going to pay $40 per share
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for the 320 million shares,
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which represents $12.8 billion,
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and it's going to be paid in cash,
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100% all cash transaction.
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Interestingly, today's the market cap is 11.8
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and the stock price is $37.
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Not yet exactly $40.
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Maybe there is a little bit
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of uncertainty about the business
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and the evolution of the merger.
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If you look at the balance sheet of June,
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the interest bearing debt,
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the financial debt represents gross value,
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1.6 billion net of cash.
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It's 0.4 billion.
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So to calculate the enterprise value,
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some people take their gross debt,
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some people take the net debt.
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At the end of the day, the enterprise value lies within a
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range, which is 13.2, $14.4 billion.
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It's around $14 billion.
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What about HPE Hewlett Packard Enterprise?
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Well, everybody on the planet knows Hewlett Packard,
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a Californian icon.
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The beginning of California
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as the early days was the first garage as far
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as innovations concerned.
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Now, Packard made some spinoffs including one in
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2017.
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Now, H HPEs know more about printers, about PCs
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or whatsoever it's about servers, networks,
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software, et cetera.
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The revenues today 2023
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are $29 billion.
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It's the same as the revenues in 2017 when the company
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was created and spun off from hp.
262
00:13:17.585 --> 00:13:19.485
So it's not very much about growth,
263
00:13:20.225 --> 00:13:24.725
and if you look back in 2013, the equivalent of HP at
264
00:13:24.725 --> 00:13:28.405
that time was generating revenues of $32 billion.
265
00:13:28.745 --> 00:13:30.245
So the company is stagnating
266
00:13:30.865 --> 00:13:33.325
and the performance is absolutely not outstanding.
267
00:13:33.425 --> 00:13:37.725
The return on capital employed is 8.5% after tax.
268
00:13:37.785 --> 00:13:39.445
It hardly pay the what?
269
00:13:40.185 --> 00:13:43.725
The what can be estimated at six, 7%, something like that.
270
00:13:44.065 --> 00:13:45.365
Now, if the rose say
271
00:13:45.495 --> 00:13:48.445
after tax pays the work, there is no positive
272
00:13:48.445 --> 00:13:50.845
or negative performance as this is why the price
273
00:13:50.845 --> 00:13:52.085
to book is one.
274
00:13:52.585 --> 00:13:55.325
The market capitalization exactly matches
275
00:13:55.395 --> 00:13:58.245
with the book equity, no value creation,
276
00:13:58.505 --> 00:14:03.245
no value distraction, and no gross as a consequent.
277
00:14:03.245 --> 00:14:06.525
The multi multiple enterprise value EBITDA is six.
278
00:14:07.185 --> 00:14:11.205
It was 16 for Juniper, but Juniper is growing
279
00:14:11.465 --> 00:14:13.885
and we are going to have a look at the rose of juniper,
280
00:14:13.885 --> 00:14:17.725
which is significantly higher as far as HEPE is concerned.
281
00:14:17.785 --> 00:14:20.125
The company is not showing any performance
282
00:14:20.625 --> 00:14:22.725
and the company is not showing any growth.
283
00:14:23.225 --> 00:14:26.205
If we run the same benchmarking process for HP
284
00:14:26.225 --> 00:14:27.765
as the one we did for Juniper,
285
00:14:27.785 --> 00:14:32.125
and we confront HP last five years with the nasdaq,
286
00:14:32.585 --> 00:14:35.085
nasdaq, same story plus 200%.
287
00:14:35.395 --> 00:14:38.565
What about HPE plus 23%.
288
00:14:39.025 --> 00:14:42.365
During the first two years of this period, there was a kind
289
00:14:42.365 --> 00:14:45.885
of parallel between the evolution of HPE and Nasdaq
290
00:14:46.625 --> 00:14:50.445
and the last three years there was a stagnation in the stock
291
00:14:50.455 --> 00:14:54.005
price of HPE when NASDAQ is skyrocketing.
292
00:14:54.535 --> 00:14:56.405
Let's go back to the financial metrics
293
00:14:56.585 --> 00:14:58.485
of Juniper Networks today.
294
00:14:58.985 --> 00:15:01.365
You remember we offered price is $40,
295
00:15:01.935 --> 00:15:05.085
which is a little bit more than the $37 per share,
296
00:15:05.085 --> 00:15:07.445
which you can read today on the screen.
297
00:15:08.305 --> 00:15:11.365
In 2023, Juniper Networks generated revenues
298
00:15:11.365 --> 00:15:13.005
of $5.6 billion,
299
00:15:14.045 --> 00:15:17.205
a little bit more than the equivalent in 20 22, 5
300
00:15:17.215 --> 00:15:18.645
$0.3 billion,
301
00:15:19.565 --> 00:15:24.165
a little bit more than the 4.9 in 2017 when Nokia
302
00:15:24.225 --> 00:15:25.765
was considering the merger.
303
00:15:26.515 --> 00:15:28.805
It's not a outstanding growth rate.
304
00:15:28.995 --> 00:15:33.005
It's smoothly growing the operating income.
305
00:15:33.145 --> 00:15:35.165
The EBIT looks a little bit better
306
00:15:35.865 --> 00:15:39.165
in 20 23, 900 $40 million,
307
00:15:39.665 --> 00:15:42.645
twenty twenty two, eight hundred and thirty $5 million.
308
00:15:42.785 --> 00:15:47.045
The return on sales operating income divided by revenues is
309
00:15:47.565 --> 00:15:51.725
17% In 2023, it was 16%
310
00:15:52.345 --> 00:15:56.485
in 2022, but the return says not the return capital.
311
00:15:56.705 --> 00:15:58.805
To calculate the return capital, you need
312
00:15:58.805 --> 00:16:00.405
to calculate the capital employed first.
313
00:16:00.515 --> 00:16:04.885
Capital employed is equity plus net financial debt.
314
00:16:05.705 --> 00:16:09.685
The book equity is 4.5 billion in 2023.
315
00:16:09.705 --> 00:16:11.285
You add the net financial debt
316
00:16:11.385 --> 00:16:15.605
and you get $4.9 billion in 2022.
317
00:16:15.665 --> 00:16:18.285
The same calculation was about the same equity,
318
00:16:18.315 --> 00:16:22.805
4.5 plus 0.5 billion, so $5 billion
319
00:16:22.945 --> 00:16:24.085
of capital employed.
320
00:16:24.945 --> 00:16:27.965
Now you can divide the EBIT by the capital employee
321
00:16:27.965 --> 00:16:29.765
to get the return on capital employed,
322
00:16:30.335 --> 00:16:33.285
which was 19% in 2023
323
00:16:33.425 --> 00:16:36.005
and 16% in 2022.
324
00:16:36.545 --> 00:16:39.565
So you can observe that it's more than the cost of capital
325
00:16:40.065 --> 00:16:41.805
and it's a little bit growing.
326
00:16:42.655 --> 00:16:45.685
Let's go back to the offer which was made by HPE.
327
00:16:45.995 --> 00:16:50.445
Offered price, $40 per share value market capitalization,
328
00:16:50.445 --> 00:16:51.445
12.8.
329
00:16:52.465 --> 00:16:55.005
Now, if you add the net interest bearing debt
330
00:16:55.305 --> 00:16:58.085
to the market cap, you get the enterprise value,
331
00:16:58.085 --> 00:17:02.285
which is 12.8 plus 0.4, 13.2.
332
00:17:02.465 --> 00:17:05.405
You remember, this is a repetition of the calculation.
333
00:17:06.115 --> 00:17:08.805
It's interesting to confirm the enterprise value
334
00:17:08.945 --> 00:17:10.005
and the capital employed,
335
00:17:10.105 --> 00:17:11.805
and then you get the market to book.
336
00:17:12.135 --> 00:17:15.725
Enterprise value divided by capital employed is 13.2 divided
337
00:17:15.745 --> 00:17:20.285
by 4.9, which is 2.7 times.
338
00:17:21.875 --> 00:17:23.685
It's quite close to the price to book,
339
00:17:23.685 --> 00:17:25.885
which was only one for HPE.
340
00:17:26.025 --> 00:17:29.165
Now it's 2.7 times the capital employed.
341
00:17:29.505 --> 00:17:31.845
You remember that the return capital employed was
342
00:17:32.445 --> 00:17:36.605
19% in 2023, and I said that it exceeds the walk.
343
00:17:36.825 --> 00:17:38.285
That's calculated the work
344
00:17:39.145 --> 00:17:41.805
to calculate the work you need the cost of equity capital,
345
00:17:41.805 --> 00:17:43.605
what is expected by shareholders,
346
00:17:44.265 --> 00:17:47.725
and then in order to apply the capital asset pricing
347
00:17:47.735 --> 00:17:48.885
model, you need better.
348
00:17:49.745 --> 00:17:54.405
The beta is supposedly close to one 0.94.
349
00:17:55.305 --> 00:17:59.605
The long term bond rate is 3.8% tenure government bond rate,
350
00:18:00.025 --> 00:18:03.925
so 3.8 plus 0.94 multiplied
351
00:18:03.925 --> 00:18:06.565
by the equity market risk premium in the United States,
352
00:18:06.565 --> 00:18:07.605
about 6%.
353
00:18:08.305 --> 00:18:12.165
You get to a cost of equity capital of 9.4%.
354
00:18:13.315 --> 00:18:14.925
Debt is much, much,
355
00:18:15.075 --> 00:18:17.365
much lower than the market capitalization.
356
00:18:17.425 --> 00:18:19.525
So it's not going to contribute very much
357
00:18:19.545 --> 00:18:20.925
to the calculations of the work.
358
00:18:21.345 --> 00:18:23.325
As an approximation, let's consider
359
00:18:23.325 --> 00:18:25.805
that the weight at average cost of capital matches
360
00:18:25.915 --> 00:18:29.605
with the cost of equity capital with 9.4%.
361
00:18:30.185 --> 00:18:32.925
In the previous calculation, I said that the market to book,
362
00:18:32.925 --> 00:18:36.765
which was offered by HPE was 2.7.
363
00:18:37.745 --> 00:18:40.405
Now we are going to confront this actual market to book
364
00:18:40.405 --> 00:18:42.325
with a calculated market to book,
365
00:18:42.865 --> 00:18:45.485
we can calculate a theoretical market to book,
366
00:18:45.545 --> 00:18:48.285
taking into consideration the economic profit.
367
00:18:48.705 --> 00:18:52.205
So the confrontation between rose after tax and the wac,
368
00:18:52.585 --> 00:18:54.765
and introducing growth in the calculation.
369
00:18:55.545 --> 00:18:57.925
The mathematical formula says that the market
370
00:18:57.945 --> 00:19:00.365
to book calculated is numerator, rose
371
00:19:00.375 --> 00:19:02.165
after tax, less growth,
372
00:19:03.195 --> 00:19:05.765
denominator walk, less growth.
373
00:19:06.985 --> 00:19:09.045
We know that the rose is 19%.
374
00:19:09.345 --> 00:19:11.565
To calculate the rose after tax, we need
375
00:19:11.565 --> 00:19:14.805
to calculate the apparent tax rate, which is about 10%.
376
00:19:15.585 --> 00:19:20.565
So the rose after tax is 19 minus tax, which is about 17%.
377
00:19:21.825 --> 00:19:24.445
The market to book, assuming that there is no growth,
378
00:19:24.905 --> 00:19:27.445
is Rosie after tax divided by the wac.
379
00:19:28.185 --> 00:19:32.365
It is 17% divided by 9.4%, 1.8.
380
00:19:33.465 --> 00:19:38.045
So at the market to book offered by HPE is 2.7,
381
00:19:38.425 --> 00:19:41.805
and the market to book without any growth is 1.8.
382
00:19:42.175 --> 00:19:46.005
There is some growth in the calculation, which is made
383
00:19:46.025 --> 00:19:50.325
by HPE the day they offer $40 per share for Juniper.
384
00:19:51.065 --> 00:19:53.005
In fact, starting from the same formula,
385
00:19:53.225 --> 00:19:55.325
you can calculate the implicit growth rate
386
00:19:55.665 --> 00:19:58.445
and you get to something which is about 5%.
387
00:19:58.945 --> 00:20:03.205
You remember the actual growth was 6% as far
388
00:20:03.205 --> 00:20:07.165
as revenues were concerned, 2023 against 2022.
389
00:20:08.145 --> 00:20:12.245
So basically HPE is paying the current gross
390
00:20:12.705 --> 00:20:13.845
and the current rose.
391
00:20:14.515 --> 00:20:15.605
What is in the hope
392
00:20:16.305 --> 00:20:18.285
and the strategy of HP
393
00:20:18.635 --> 00:20:20.845
that the merger is going to create growth?
394
00:20:22.025 --> 00:20:26.725
HP is stagnating. Juniper is smoothly growing.
395
00:20:27.625 --> 00:20:30.405
Is a merger between these two companies going
396
00:20:30.405 --> 00:20:32.285
to create growth opportunities?
397
00:20:32.675 --> 00:20:35.565
What about performance? Juniper is performing.
398
00:20:36.155 --> 00:20:39.245
Juniper's economic profit is significantly positive.
399
00:20:39.955 --> 00:20:41.805
What about HPE Neil?
400
00:20:42.105 --> 00:20:46.405
No performance, no profit, no loss compared with a wac.
401
00:20:47.145 --> 00:20:49.565
So the question is, is the merger going
402
00:20:49.565 --> 00:20:51.285
to create growth opportunities?
403
00:20:51.985 --> 00:20:54.045
Is it going to contribute to performance?
404
00:20:55.195 --> 00:20:57.005
Basically, the answer which is
405
00:20:57.205 --> 00:21:00.485
provided today by Wall Street, by the capital market is
406
00:21:00.485 --> 00:21:03.965
that Ulet Packers interest in Juniper is not
407
00:21:04.495 --> 00:21:06.325
connecting with Wall Street.
408
00:21:07.025 --> 00:21:09.845
So Wall Street, the capital markets do not trust
409
00:21:09.845 --> 00:21:12.165
that this merger is going to create a lot of value.
410
00:21:13.355 --> 00:21:16.875
What will happen, we'll see. Thank you very much.
Hello and welcome to this Vidcast, which is devoted to the acquisition of Juniper Networks by Hewlett Packard Enterprise by HPE.
First, let's start with a little bit of historical background.
Once upon a time in the seventies in Palo Alto, there is a creation of the Palo Alto Research Center, but it comes from a little bit earlier, a a few years before a person invented a technology thanks to which you can replace a classical photo copier by dry writing.
The patent is offered to Kodak, to Eastman Kodak, and to IBM.
They're going to refuse following the very well known principle of not invented here.
I did not invent, so it's not good.
The company whose name is Helo Corporation based in Rochester, New York Bay, is always the same town as Eastman.
Kodak is going to buy the patent.
The CEO is going to bet the future of the company on the patent, and it's going to become Xerox.
It comes from ancient Greek.
Zero graph means dry writing, something like that.
The company is going to experience a monopolistic situation during a few years and it's going to make a lot of money.
But the problem is one day the patent will expire.
And what about next? Next, you will have to offer new innovative product to customers, and this is why the Palo Alto Research Center is created by Xerox.
In order to develop innovations, there will be up to 5,000 researchers in a kind of freedom in this very well-known institution at that time.
Xerox is generating a 60% gross margin, which is absolutely huge, a very significant part of that.
It's going to be invested in research and development, Palo Alto Research Center.
Now, they are going to develop plenty of technologies, for example, local Hart Networks, ethernet and so on, so forth, and they're going to develop the laser printers, which are going to more or less replace the photocopiers in their top line, inner the revenues of Xerox.
So there will be plenty of innovations coming from the park, but Fortune Magazine published an article in the eighties who started, was a lab that ran away from Xerox.
Xerox was Helo Corporation based in Rochester, New York.
They're going to move the head office from Rochester to Stanford, Connecticut, but from east coast to east coast, Palo Alto is in California.
It's a west coast, and there is a very important cultural misunderstanding between the east coast and the west coast.
The communication between r and d and marketing is going to be a disaster for the marketing experts.
All these innovations are kind of gimmicks, including the very famous mouse which was created in the park.
When the marketing experts saw the mouse, it says there is absolutely no future.
The arrow keys in the computer, it's much better Now as a consequence of the relationship between Xerox and Apple, Steve Jobs is allowed to do a kind of shopping in the park and is going to buy and integrate the mouse with a wig graphical interface, et cetera, et cetera.
So these innovations created by Xerox are going to be developed in the product sold by Apple.
These innovations are going to get out of the research center, but the researchers themselves are going to be quite frustrated by the process.
They're going to go out and they are going to create their own startups among the researchers who left the park to create their own companies.
As an Indian person whose name is Pip Sindu, he's a very well known scientist, very experienced one.
He spent 11 years in the park and he's an expert in telecommunications equipment.
In 1996, he leaves Park to create a company whose name is Juniper Networks.
Now he's a great scientist, but technology is not enough.
You need a manager and Crosspoint Venture Partners.
He's going to hire Scott Green, who is going to be the CEO from 1996 to 2008.
Then it will step back as a CEO, but remain chairman of the board.
The person who really contributed to the fantastic development of gene repair networks in the early years is Scott Cranes.
Now we are in the nineties, second half of the nineties, and these are the golden years for the telecommunication equipment industry.
A very well-known Canadian company, Northern Telecom, Nortel Networks, whose end is going to be absolutely terrible is selling telecom equipment to 90% of the Fortune 500 companies loosened.
The telecom equipment activity within at and t is going to be spun off in 1996 to start its life by itself.
ENT will merge with Alcatel in 2006 and Alcatel ENT is going to be acquired by Nokia in 2016.
Nokia is so well known for the very famous terminal right in the mobile business.
Ericsson is also a very big player.
They are going to invent the Bluetooth technology, but in this industry, the number one is definitely Cisco.
In March, 2000, Cisco is going to be the largest worldwide capitalization of stock market during three months, and the value of the company at that time is $500 billion, which is absolutely outstanding.
20 something years ago.
The second half of the nineties is the explosion of telecommunication equipment, but it is a creation of the internet bubble.
So-called Internet bubble.
If you look back in 95, the NASDAQ is about 600, 700.
It's going to go up to 4,500 and more in March, 2000, and then it's going to dramatically go down.
The Nasdaq is going to lose two thirds of its value back to 1,500.
Today, NASDAQ is not back to 4,000 and something.
Today NASDAQ is 16,000.
So the tech business is doing quite well.
What about the business of Juniper Networks? Juniper is a Cisco killer.
They are plenty of competitors and they all are supposed to be challenges of Cisco, the number one, and there's a technological advantage for Juniper because the software is embedded in the hardware, which is not the case of Cisco.
If you want to buy the equipment at Cisco, the router, you have to buy the hardware and you have to integrate the software.
It's already done by Juniper.
This is a technological advantage, but Cisco has a much broader product range to offer to the customers, which is a business advantage, an outstanding business advantage.
So on the one side, you have outstanding scientific performance for Juniper and very big business offer for Cisco.
What's going to be absolutely outstanding in the development of Juniper is revenues.
The company is created in 19 96, 8 years later in 2004, the company's generating 4 billion euros of turnover starting from scratch.
Eight years before, just to give you an idea, apple took 11 euros to move from zero to $4 billion of revenues.
It gives you an idea about the quality of the business development.
Now in terms of market share, for the core routers, the business in which Cisco is a leader in 2001, the market share of Juniper is 37%.
So it's very successful scientific performance, business performance.
Now what about stock market performance? The company is listed in 1999.
Exactly when the NASDAQ is skyrocketing, the stock price is showing plus 191% the first day of listing.
You remember in another vidcast I explained what happened to Snowflake.
As far as Snowflake was concerned, the stock price was multiplied by two.
The first day of listing here, it's almost multiplied by three.
During the first year of quotation, the stock price is going to be multiplied by five, but it is a consequence of the creation of this internet bubble.
Now, quite quickly, the company is reaching a revenue of 4 billion, and that is going to stabilize in 2017 when Nokia is potentially interested in buying Juniper networks for $16 billion.
The revenues generated by the company are only 4.9 billion.
You remember it was 4 billion in 2004, and both Nokia and Juniper are looking for clients, for new clients, for gross revenues.
When Juniper is listed, the market capitalization is $1.7 billion and the stock price is $34 per share.
Now the nominal is going to be divided by six, and today the stock market, the market capitalization of the company is 11.8, almost $12 billion.
And the stock price recently because of the acquisition, moved from 30 to 37.
So it looks like the same stock price, but the nominal has been divided by six.
This is why the value has been multiplied by six.
Now, there is a very interesting multiple, which gives you an idea about the profitability, the performance of the company, but also the prospects for growth.
Multiple is enterprise value divided by a bid, and it is 16, which demonstrate that the market sees some in potential improvement in the situation of Juniper.
It's quite interesting to confront the evolution of Juniper the last five years and the evolution of the Nasdaq.
Very simply, as far as the NASDAQ is concerned, multiplied by two, of course there were some fluctuations.
It went up dramatically.
It went down.
It's up again from five years ago to today, plus 200%.
As far as Juniper is concerned, it's plus 27 up to the murmur.
The HPE is making an offer and today it's plus 60%, but as a consequence of the offer, but standing alone, uh, the last five years, it shows a return of plus 27% for the shareholders.
A few weeks ago, the 10th of January, 2024, HPE Hewlett Packet Enterprise announces that it's going to buy Juniper Networks for an enterprise value of $14 billion.
HP is going to pay $40 per share for the 320 million shares, which represents $12.8 billion, and it's going to be paid in cash, 100% all cash transaction.
Interestingly, today's the market cap is 11.8 and the stock price is $37.
Not yet exactly $40.
Maybe there is a little bit of uncertainty about the business and the evolution of the merger.
If you look at the balance sheet of June, the interest bearing debt, the financial debt represents gross value, 1.6 billion net of cash.
It's 0.4 billion.
So to calculate the enterprise value, some people take their gross debt, some people take the net debt.
At the end of the day, the enterprise value lies within a range, which is 13.2, $14.4 billion.
It's around $14 billion.
What about HPE Hewlett Packard Enterprise? Well, everybody on the planet knows Hewlett Packard, a Californian icon.
The beginning of California as the early days was the first garage as far as innovations concerned.
Now, Packard made some spinoffs including one in 2017.
Now, H HPEs know more about printers, about PCs or whatsoever it's about servers, networks, software, et cetera.
The revenues today 2023 are $29 billion.
It's the same as the revenues in 2017 when the company was created and spun off from hp.
So it's not very much about growth, and if you look back in 2013, the equivalent of HP at that time was generating revenues of $32 billion.
So the company is stagnating and the performance is absolutely not outstanding.
The return on capital employed is 8.5% after tax.
It hardly pay the what? The what can be estimated at six, 7%, something like that.
Now, if the rose say after tax pays the work, there is no positive or negative performance as this is why the price to book is one.
The market capitalization exactly matches with the book equity, no value creation, no value distraction, and no gross as a consequent.
The multi multiple enterprise value EBITDA is six.
It was 16 for Juniper, but Juniper is growing and we are going to have a look at the rose of juniper, which is significantly higher as far as HEPE is concerned.
The company is not showing any performance and the company is not showing any growth.
If we run the same benchmarking process for HP as the one we did for Juniper, and we confront HP last five years with the nasdaq, nasdaq, same story plus 200%.
What about HPE plus 23%.
During the first two years of this period, there was a kind of parallel between the evolution of HPE and Nasdaq and the last three years there was a stagnation in the stock price of HPE when NASDAQ is skyrocketing.
Let's go back to the financial metrics of Juniper Networks today.
You remember we offered price is $40, which is a little bit more than the $37 per share, which you can read today on the screen.
In 2023, Juniper Networks generated revenues of $5.6 billion, a little bit more than the equivalent in 20 22, 5 $0.3 billion, a little bit more than the 4.9 in 2017 when Nokia was considering the merger.
It's not a outstanding growth rate.
It's smoothly growing the operating income.
The EBIT looks a little bit better in 20 23, 900 $40 million, twenty twenty two, eight hundred and thirty $5 million.
The return on sales operating income divided by revenues is 17% In 2023, it was 16% in 2022, but the return says not the return capital.
To calculate the return capital, you need to calculate the capital employed first.
Capital employed is equity plus net financial debt.
The book equity is 4.5 billion in 2023.
You add the net financial debt and you get $4.9 billion in 2022.
The same calculation was about the same equity, 4.5 plus 0.5 billion, so $5 billion of capital employed.
Now you can divide the EBIT by the capital employee to get the return on capital employed, which was 19% in 2023 and 16% in 2022.
So you can observe that it's more than the cost of capital and it's a little bit growing.
Let's go back to the offer which was made by HPE.
Offered price, $40 per share value market capitalization, 12.8.
Now, if you add the net interest bearing debt to the market cap, you get the enterprise value, which is 12.8 plus 0.4, 13.2.
You remember, this is a repetition of the calculation.
It's interesting to confirm the enterprise value and the capital employed, and then you get the market to book.
Enterprise value divided by capital employed is 13.2 divided by 4.9, which is 2.7 times.
It's quite close to the price to book, which was only one for HPE.
Now it's 2.7 times the capital employed.
You remember that the return capital employed was 19% in 2023, and I said that it exceeds the walk.
That's calculated the work to calculate the work you need the cost of equity capital, what is expected by shareholders, and then in order to apply the capital asset pricing model, you need better.
The beta is supposedly close to one 0.94.
The long term bond rate is 3.8% tenure government bond rate, so 3.8 plus 0.94 multiplied by the equity market risk premium in the United States, about 6%.
You get to a cost of equity capital of 9.4%.
Debt is much, much, much lower than the market capitalization.
So it's not going to contribute very much to the calculations of the work.
As an approximation, let's consider that the weight at average cost of capital matches with the cost of equity capital with 9.4%.
In the previous calculation, I said that the market to book, which was offered by HPE was 2.7.
Now we are going to confront this actual market to book with a calculated market to book, we can calculate a theoretical market to book, taking into consideration the economic profit.
So the confrontation between rose after tax and the wac, and introducing growth in the calculation.
The mathematical formula says that the market to book calculated is numerator, rose after tax, less growth, denominator walk, less growth.
We know that the rose is 19%.
To calculate the rose after tax, we need to calculate the apparent tax rate, which is about 10%.
So the rose after tax is 19 minus tax, which is about 17%.
The market to book, assuming that there is no growth, is Rosie after tax divided by the wac.
It is 17% divided by 9.4%, 1.8.
So at the market to book offered by HPE is 2.7, and the market to book without any growth is 1.8.
There is some growth in the calculation, which is made by HPE the day they offer $40 per share for Juniper.
In fact, starting from the same formula, you can calculate the implicit growth rate and you get to something which is about 5%.
You remember the actual growth was 6% as far as revenues were concerned, 2023 against 2022.
So basically HPE is paying the current gross and the current rose.
What is in the hope and the strategy of HP that the merger is going to create growth? HP is stagnating.
Juniper is smoothly growing.
Is a merger between these two companies going to create growth opportunities? What about performance? Juniper is performing.
Juniper's economic profit is significantly positive.
What about HPE Neil? No performance, no profit, no loss compared with a wac.
So the question is, is the merger going to create growth opportunities? Is it going to contribute to performance? Basically, the answer which is provided today by Wall Street, by the capital market is that Ulet Packers interest in Juniper is not connecting with Wall Street.
So Wall Street, the capital markets do not trust that this merger is going to create a lot of value.
What will happen, we'll see.
Thank you very much.